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* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
* *
* CHAPTER 6: OPERATION COBRA AND BREAKOUT *
* *
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
After establishing a bridgehead, allied forces bogged down.
To the east, British and Canadian divisions were running
into the strong forces Hitler had placed in their path near
Caen. American units were finding it difficult to make
progress in the hedgerow country. The allied high
command searched for a way to break the stalemate.
After examining various options, General Omar Bradley
decided on Cobra. The name was appropriate, since, like
the snake, this operation was deadly. The difficulty was
that it killed Americans as well as Germans.
Just as D-Day is etched in my memory, so are July 24
and 25, 1944. I still shudder when recalling my
experiences, particularly those where death barely passed
me by.
When going through my letters, I found only one related
to Cobra. Perhaps this was just as well. My letters home
must have worried my family enough without a graphic
description of that event.
Dear Folks, July 28, 1944, Somewhere in France
C'est la guerre. Indeed, just now it is extremely difficult
to find time to do anything I should like. I see by the
radio that the First American army has achieved a
breakthrough here in Normandy. Indeed things are
looking up.
It is strange. All the soldiers ask here, amid one of the
greatest battles our armies have ever fought, is, "How are
the Russians doing? How far are they from Warsaw?" I
daresay that the Russians, amidst their great fight, are
asking the same of us.
Love, John
The US Army history has this to say about the planning
for Operation Cobra:
"General Bradley presented the Cobra idea at a conference
with his staff and his corps commanders on 12 July. He
characterized the battle of the hedgerows as "tough and
costly...a slugger's match...too slow a process," and spoke
of his hope for a swift advance made possible by "three
or four thousand tons of bombs" from the air. He stated
that aggressive action and a readiness to take stiff losses
if necessary were the keys to the success of Cobra. "If
they [the Germans] get set [again]," he warned, "we go
right back to the hedge fighting and you can't make any
speed." He insisted, "This thing [Cobra] must be bold."
(Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, pages
213-214.)
Perhaps because of his close personal relations with Lt.
Gen. J. Lawton Collins, General Bradley again chose the
VII Corps to make the main effort. As a result, the 4th
Division, flanked by the 9th and 30th, was again in the
front line.
Having been employed for the British Operation
Goodwood near Caen on July 18, Operation Cobra was
the second time a large number of bombers were used in
a tactical role. The plan was for the front line forces to
draw back from the St. Lô-Périers road. The Army
proposed 800 yards and the air commanders 3,000. They
compromised on 1,500. Thousands of aircraft would use
the road as a bomb line for a rectangle about five miles
wide and one mile deep. After that, the artillery would
bombard the target area. The infantry would then attack
any Germans who remained alive and able to fight. Once
the breakthrough was established, armored units would
exploit it.
This was a bold plan. There was, however, one important
detail which was left dangling. When conferring with Air
Chief Marshall Leigh-Mallory and other air commanders,
Bradley expressed a preference for the aircraft to attack
parallel to the road. Thus, he maintained, any bombs
which fell short would not drop on American forces. He
failed, however, to pin the air commanders down on this,
and those commanding the heavy and medium bombers
decided to bomb perpendicular to the road. According to
US Air Force documents, the air planners had understood
that General Bradley expected heavy casualties and was
prepared to accept them no matter how the bombing took
place.
A NARROW ESCAPE
During the morning of July 24, I entered a farm yard. I
do not remember why I was there, since the First
Battalion to which I was attached was in reserve. I do
remember clearly, however, what happened.
As I approached the farm, an infantryman warned me
that the Germans had it under observation and had been
firing artillery shells when anyone entered the yard. I
crossed the open space, therefore, quickly and went into
a barn. A young officer was lying on his back on a table.
At first, I thought he was asleep. Then I noticed the
ashen color a face takes on after a person dies. I looked
at him for awhile, trying to discover any signs that he
had been hit. There were none.
Leaving this building, I ducked into a nearby shed, where
I found Capt. Claude Mercer, liaison officer to the Second
Battalion, lying on a stretcher. I said, "Mercer, what in
the hell happened to you?" Fortunately, rather than
replying to my question, he said, "Get out of that door,
you dumb bastard!" Just as I took a step forward to
where I was protected by the shed's stone wall, an
artillery shell exploded in the farmyard. Shell fragments
flew through the door where I had been and hit the wall
beyond.
All this happened so quickly that I was not sure later
whether I had thanked Claude. This was on my mind for
many years, and I was glad to see him in 1980 at a 4th
Division reunion. This gave me a chance to express my
appreciation for his saving my life.
Meanwhile, there was great confusion both at higher
headquarters and on the ground. The official US Army
history puts it this way:
"Air Chief Marshall Leigh-Mallory had set the Cobra
H-Hour at 1300, 24 July and on the morning of 24 July
he went to Normandy to observe the operation. He found
the sky overcast, the clouds thick. Deciding the visibility
was inadequate for the attack, he ordered a
postponement. Unfortunately, he was too late. The
message announcing the decision reached England only
a few minutes before the actual bombing was to
commence in France. Although the planes were ordered
to return without making their bombing runs, it was
impossible to get them all back." (Blumenson, Breakout
and Pursuit, p. 228.)
Before word reached General Collins that the ground
attack had been postponed, he ordered the divisions to
move forward. The 30th, however, was unable to do this,
because bombs which fell short killed and wounded a
number of men in the assault units. Even when he got
word the ground attack had been put off, Collins decided
that the corps had to move back to the road, in order to
prevent the Germans from moving forward.
With Claude Mercer out of action, I reported to the
commander of the Second Battalion and told him I would
take over as liaison officer. At that point, the battalion
staff had taken shelter in a stone shed on the side of
the farmhouse away from the German artillery. Every
once in a while, a shell would hit the top of the house,
and tiles would thunder down onto the roof of the shed.
Although not terribly dangerous, it was unnerving.
Having no telephone communications with the forward
observers who were with the infantry companies, I told
Orville Schroeder, my communications sergeant, to lay
lines to them. Understandably, he protested, saying,
"Those Germans have us under observation. It will be
suicide to go out there." I insisted, however, that he do
it, since it was essential to have communications. He
looked at me and said, "All right. I'll do it. But, if I am
killed, it will be on your conscience."
The most difficult thing in battle is to order men to do
things which could cost their lives. There is, however,
often little choice. This was one of those times. I was,
nevertheless, greatly relieved when Sgt. Schroeder
reappeared, having laid the telephone lines. Partly to cope
with my feelings of guilt, I later recommended him for an
award.
Since my crew included only three enlisted men, my
responsibilities were limited, when compared with infantry
commanders. I am glad to say, however, that none of
them were killed and only one was slightly wounded
during my time as a liaison officer.
When General Bradley discovered on July 24 that his
proposal for the direction of the bombing had not been
followed, he was furious, for he was confronted with a
terrible dilemma. To change the plans at that point would
have meant delaying several days. Higher headquarters
were pressing for action, and there was the danger the
Germans would rush additional forces into the
breakthrough area. General Bradley decided, therefore, to
go ahead the next day, July 25.
COBRA STRIKES AGAIN
There was bitterness among the troops about the events
of July 24, particularly when we learned that there had
been no emergency communications with the bombers.
Nevertheless, we had little choice but to put this behind
us, since the attack was rescheduled for 11:00 the next
day. While not perfect, the weather was better. The
bombers dropped over 4000 tons of bombs. Although the
fighter bombers flew parallel to the road, the medium and
heavy bombers again flew a perpendicular path, and
bombs again fell short.
I have seen various figures on casualties, but the total for
the two days was over a hundred killed and nearly five
hundred wounded. Among those killed was Lt. Gen. Leslie
J. McNair. Since the Germans had been led to believe
McNair was in England, he was buried secretly with only
senior officers present.
In the midst of the bombing, I was walking down a lane
which had hedgerows on each side. While I was well
aware of the explosions, I was preoccupied with looking
for Sgt. Schroeder, again in connection with telephone
lines. I only learned later, therefore, how far in back of
me bombs had fallen.
After that day, my memory becomes fuzzy. I recall that
the battalion advanced into the bombing rectangle and
that the destruction stunned me. I recollect talking to a
German prisoner, who was shaking like a leaf. When I
asked him why he had continued fighting, he replied,
"Because I was ordered to." I also reluctantly remember
seeing a young girl who was killed by our artillery while
milking a cow, a scene that haunted my dreams for many
years. Other than that, my mind is a total blank about
a period of days, during which we were in intensive
combat.
Lt. Gen. Fritz Bayerlein commanded the Panzer Lehr
Division, which took the brunt of the bombing. After the
war he said the bombing was a surprise and devastated
his forces. "The whole place looked like a moonscape," he
said, adding, "The survivors were like madmen and could
not be used for anything." Although there was resistance
in the bombed area, Bayerlein's statement was
substantially correct.
AFTERTOUGHTS ON COBRA
It is not easy to convey what happens when a rifle
company attacks, let alone what happened after the July
25 bombing and artillery barrage. Fortunately, a historian
attached to the 4th Division interviewed the commanders
of C Company of the First Battalion shortly after the
battle. These were Lt. Joseph L. Gude and Lt. William
Woodruff, who took over the company after Gude stepped
on a nail when hopping over a fence. This is a summary
of their account.
The company moved into the line of departure shortly
before the bombing. Fortunately, the troops which had
been there had been well dug in, and C Company had
dug more. Although a few of the men had to be dug out
after the bombing, only one man was injured. As a result,
the company was able to move forward when the artillery
barrage ended.
In the first thousand yards, the company ran into little
resistance. The rifle and machine gun fire they received
was disorganized and did not last long.
When the company reached the St. Lô-Périers highway,
they saw a German lying under a vehicle. It would have
been easy to shoot him, but Sgt. Blake decided to
capture him. As he advanced, the German shot and killed
him. A few seconds later the German was also dead.
With the help of tanks, the company overcame resistance
from houses near the crossroad. At that point, the tank
dozer was damaged. Since the tanks depended on it to
knock down hedgerows, they were unable to continue
until the dozer was repaired. C Company, therefore,
crossed the highway and advanced without the tanks.
About seven hundred yards further south, a bazooka
team had to knock out a tank before the company could
continue its advance. By that time, Company B had come
abreast of C, accompanied by tanks. These fired on
houses from which Germans were firing, and the shooting
ceased.
Continuing their advance toward la Chapelle en Juger,
the company made contact with the 9th Division, which
was on the 4th Division's right, but in an unwanted way.
It began to receive what is now called friendly fire in the
form of artillery. As the interview said, "The shells were
bursting right over our heads. We hugged the ditches
along the hedgerows which was the only cover we had.
We were very fortunate and had only one casualty, a first
platoon man who was hit in the shoulder."
The following day, the company took la Chapelle en Juger
without resistance, capturing a few prisoners. When the
company received fire from a gun south of the town, it
used its mortars and hit the German ammunition dump.
"The explosion was something to see and it completely
destroyed the gun."
When the company reached the road running east from
Marigny, it saw a number of Germans coming out of the
town. It swung the tanks across the road to block them.
After a short fire fight, the company captured fifteen
prisoners.
Crossing the St. Lô-Coutances highway, the company
occupied an orchard a few hundred yards to its south.
Being on the battalion objective, it paused. During those
two days, the company had only two casualties, Sgt.
Blake and the man wounded by the 9th Division artillery.
Looking back on the experience, Gude said, "I believe
every man in the company will agree that if we have such
an attack again they would want the bombing just where
it was, right up to our lines. We would rather take the
ones that fall on us to get the effect on the Germans
right in front of us. This bombing completely destroyed
organized German resistance all the way thru their
position. Such Germans as we found were relatively easy
to handle."
Despite our great victory, Operation Cobra caused
considerable controversy. After the bombing, General
Eisenhower was exasperated about the large number of
American casualties. In his memoirs, A Soldier's Story,
General Bradley declared the perpendicular approach an
act of perfidy on the part of the air forces, "a serious
breach of good faith in planning."
I have read a number of accounts of the planning for
Operation Cobra, and it is not easy to be sure just what
happened. What is clear is that there was a great deal of
tension among the senior commanders, because the
landing seemed to have bogged down in the hedgerow
country and at Caen. Furthermore, the air commanders
did not welcome General Bradley telling them how to do
their business. For one thing, it would not have been
possible to fly so many bombers through a one mile wide
rectangle in an hour, the time limit set by Bradley for the
bombing. In addition, the air commanders decided the
parallel route would expose their aircraft to more
antiaircraft fire than the perpendicular. What is not clear
is why this was not thrashed out at the planning meeting
by the generals or later by their staffs.
An even more serious question is why there was no
emergency ground to air communications. Had there been
communications with the aircraft from the ground, the
casualties could at the very least have been reduced.
********************
COMMENDATIONS FOR EVENTS DURING COBRA
I received a Bronze Star and later a Silver Star for my
performance during Cobra. The Bronze Star citation was
so effusive that I would be embarrased for anyone to see
it. Although, as usual, my Silver Star exaggerated, it
came reasonably close to what happened.
HEADQUARTERS
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 4, US ARMY
Subject: Unexpurgated Citation to Award of Silver Star
To: Captain John Ausland, 01167725, Field Artillery, 29th
Field Artillery Battalion
Citation:
"JOHN AUSLAND, 01167725, Captain (then First Lieutenant)
Field Artillery, 29th Field Artillery Battalion, for gallantry
in action in the vicinity of La Mardell, France, 24 July
1944. Captain AUSLAND was artillery liaison officer with
the second of two infantry battalions attacking in column
formation. An intense enemy artillery concentration
registered on the leading unit, wounding its liaison officer
and destroyed wire communications. The battalion in the
rear was ordered to withdraw to an assembly area.
Captain AUSLAND immediately left this element and
advanced to the forward group. Although a large volume
of hostile fire continued to fall throughout the area, he
immediately reestablished wire communication between
the forward observer and the fire direction center. As a
result, effective counterfire was directed on the enemy's
units. He then voluntarily reported to the battalion
commander as liaison officer and, for several hours
afterward, expertly directed and coordinated artillery fire
upon hostile positions. His initiative and enterprise in
this instance were material factors in the seizure of the
battalion objective. Captain AUSLAND's courage,
enterprise and complete application to duty are in
keeping with the finest traditions of the military service."
H.W. BLAKELEY,
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Commanding.
